Defeatism Defeated by Baker-Hytch, Max & Benton, Matthew A
Seattle Pacific University
Digital Commons @ SPU
SPU Works
January 1st, 2015
Defeatism Defeated
Max Baker-Hytch
Matthew A. Benton
Seattle Pacific University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.spu.edu/works
Part of the Epistemology Commons, and the Probability Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ SPU. It has been accepted for inclusion in SPU Works by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ SPU.
Recommended Citation
Max Baker-Hytch and Matthew A. Benton, "Defeatism Defeated,' Philosophical Perspectives 29 (2015): 40-66.
Philosophical Perspectives  (): –
(please cite published version)
Defeatism Defeated
Max Baker-Hytch Matthew A. Benton
University of Notre Dame University of Notre Dame
 Introduction
Many epistemologists are enamored with a defeat condition on knowl-
edge. While the details can differ considerably, these “defeatists” tend
to agree that in addition to a belief’s being non-accidentally true and jus-
tified there is a no-defeater condition (perhaps built into the justification
condition) which must be fulfilled for that belief to count as knowledge.
In this paper we present several difficulties for defeatism, understood
along either internalist or externalist lines. We then argue that one who
accepts the knowledge norm of belief, according to which one ought to
believe only what one knows, can explain much of the motivation for de-
featism. Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (, ) explains the plausibility of
defeat by appeal to the knower engaging in an “unreasonable” stance.
Our approach supplements hers, but goes beyond it by sketching an ac-
count based on the knowledge norm of what makes belief “unreasonable”
See pioneering work by Chisholm (, ), Lehrer and Paxson (), Klein (),
and Pollock (); more recent advocates include Plantinga (, –), Swinburne
(, ff.), Bergmann (, ), Kvanvig (), Lackey (, Ch. ), and Gold-
berg (), among many others.
Lasonen-Aarnio thinks of knowledge as mere safe belief: thus many cases of belief
in the face of putative defeat remain knowledge, but they exhibit an unreasonable stance
in virtue of manifesting a bad epistemic habit which, in the long run, will result in less
knowledge despite being modally reliable in their local environment. We compare our
approach with hers in §.

in some of cases of putative defeat. This is an important result, because
on the one hand it respects the plausibility of the intuitions about defeat
shared by many in epistemology; but on the other hand, it obviates the
need to provide a unified account of defeat that plays well with the most
plausible views of how knowledge fits with evidential probability.
 Distinguishing Defeaters
Defeatists often distinguish between internal or mental state defeaters,
and external facts which can defeat even if the subject is unaware of them
(Bergmann , ch. ; Lackey , –; Pryor , ). Internalist
defeatism tends to invoke as a requirement of rationality that one not be-
lieve a proposition p when one also gains evidence for, or recognizes that
one cannot rule out, the truth of another proposition which indicates that
one’s belief that p is false or unreliably formed (or sustained). Such de-
featers are sometimes called psychological or mental state defeaters, which
do their defeating in virtue of being “had,” mentally, by the subject. In-
ternalists of this stripe tend to think that having the relevant psychologi-
cal state tends to defeat knowledge by defeating one’s justification: if one
gains information suggesting that one’s evidence or reason E for believing
that p is not as truth-conducive as one had assumed, one often thereby
loses the justification one had from E for believing that p. In § we shall
examine one such approach, with a focus on what it takes to acquire a
defeater.
Externalist defeatists, though they typically permit a kind of mental
Cf. also discussion by Hawthorne and Srinivasan (, –).
That the defeating proposition may indicate either falsity or unreliability means that
it could be either a “rebutting” or an “undercutting” defeater, respectively: see Pollock
() for more.
Though much depends here on how the internalist defeatist thinks of justification:
if justification encodes a notion of doxastic permission, and is a threshold conception
which sets a different threshold for doxastic justification from that of knowledge-level
justification, then in a certain kind of case one might lose knowledge-level justification
without losing doxastic justification.

state defeat like that above, tend to allow that a proposition can defeat
one’s justification whether one is aware of that fact or not. Some exter-
nalist defeatists think of these as normative defeaters, that is, a doubt or
belief which a subject ought to have (given the evidence or information
available to that subject: Lackey ,  fn. ; Goldberg forthcominga);
whereas others don’t require that one ought to believe them for them to
defeat one’s knowledge (Klein , ). While the above gloss permits
these defeaters to be false propositions, since one’s evidence might sup-
port a falsehood, such defeaters are more often regarded as truths. Thus
many externalists about defeat endorse factual defeaters: a factual defeater
is a true proposition (perhaps that one ought to believe given the informa-
tion available) which, if added to one’s beliefs or one’s evidence, would
render the belief in question unjustified. Though it is often left unsaid
just what this involves, it presumably involves the idea that adding a de-
feating true proposition D to one’s evidence E for p significantly lowers, or
would lower, the probability of p: at the very least, Pr(p | E&D) < Pr(p | E),
even if one does not yet believe D. We consider externalist approaches at
length in §. Then in § we go on to offer a knowledge-centric approach
to epistemic rationality.
 Internal Difficulties for Defeat
Internalists who think of doxastic justification in terms of basing one’s
belief on evidence that supports it tend to think of defeat in terms of
probability-lowering. On this picture, to acquire a defeater for one’s belief
that p is simply to add something to one’s evidence such that one’s evi-
dence no longer supports p. Richard Swinburne is representative of this
approach:
[F]or the internalist, for whom a belief is justified if and only
Indeed, for any case in which one’s evidence supports a falsehood which ought to
be believed, one might defer to the fact that one’s evidence supports this as the relevant
defeater: in this way, false normative defeaters reduce to factual defeaters after all.
Cf. Klein’s (, –) “strong characterization” of defeat.

if it is supported on objective a priori criteria by his evi-
dence, these [defeating] ‘circumstances’ are just new evidence;
both undermining [undercutting] and overriding [rebutting]
involve the believer acquiring new evidence that together with
the old evidence no longer gives enough support to the original
belief to make it justified... An undermining defeater will leave
the belief as likely to be true as it had been without the original
positive evidence in its support. An overriding defeater makes
it likely that the original belief was false. (Swinburne ,
–)
Suppose then that one believes p on the basis of one’s total evidence q
and that one’s priors are such that Pr(p | q) > Pr(p). On the above ap-
proach, an undermining or undercutting defeater would be a proposi-
tion d which is added to one’s evidence and which cancels or “screens
off” the probabilistic support that q would otherwise lend to p. Formally,
Pr(p | q & d) ≈ Pr(p). An undercutting defeater thus is supposed to bring
it about that typically, the probability of p on one’s evidence reverts to
(roughly) the prior probability that p (prior, that is, to q’s being added to
one’s evidence).
We want to suggest, however, that this picture of how undercutters can
defeat knowledge is seriously flawed, at least given the two most plausible
ways of spelling out which proposition is to be added to one’s evidence.
Consider a paradigm case of undercutting defeat. You are in a factory and
stop to observe a conveyor belt carrying red-looking widgets. You have
no prior information about the color of the widgets. Given the way they
look, you form the belief, and come to know, that the widgets are red.
An employee then tells you that the widgets are being irradiated by red
lights. According to the picture just sketched about how defeat works,
Compare also BonJour (), Pryor (), and Kvanvig (), though they do not
invoke details about probability-lowering.
Cf. Pollock (, ), and Chandler (). We use “≈” rather than “=” because it
is possible for one’s updating upon the new evidence including a defeater to revert one
to a slightly higher or lower credence for the original p.

the proposition someone told you that the widgets are being irradiated by red
lights is added to your evidence and is thereby supposed to screen off the
part of your evidence that had made it probable for you that the widgets
are red, and thus you no longer know. Of course, it matters crucially here
how we characterize your initial evidence for believing that the widgets
are red. Does the relevant portion of your evidence consist only of the
proposition that it appears that the widgets are red, or does it include also
the proposition that the widgets are red? Either way lies trouble.
If one takes the latter route, then it is clear that defeat simply cannot
be modelled in terms of the probabilistic framework just sketched. For
if one initially knows that the widgets are red and one’s evidence comes
to include that proposition, adding to one’s evidence the proposition that
someone told you that the widgets are being irradiated by red lights (or that
the widgets are being irradiated by red light) will do nothing at all to re-
duce the overall probability on one’s evidence that the widgets are red—
that probability on that evidence will be . One prominent account of
evidence which has this result is the view that one’s evidence is all and
only what one knows (E=K) (Williamson , Ch. ). But it isn’t just
E=K that allows propositions like the widgets are red into one’s evidence
when known; any view that allows more than just appearance proposi-
tions into one’s evidence will allow that there can be cases where a sub-
ject’s evidence includes a non-appearance proposition p and where the
subject subsequently comes to believe a proposition d according to which
her belief that p was formed in a defective way. In any case of this sort,
adding d to the subject’s evidence will not by itself do anything to dimin-
ish the probability of p on the subject’s evidence.
Of course, if upon coming to believe d the subject drops her belief that p, p will—
on E=K, at least—thereby drop out of the subject’s evidence and consequently p will
become less probable on her total evidence. But we take it that the defeatist picture
under consideration here is supposed to get the result that p’s probability is diminished
on the subject’s evidence even if the subject doesn’t drop the belief that p upon coming to
believe d. Note also that sometimes one’s belief that p gets dropped as a result of adding
a defeater to one’s evidence, so p gets defeated in this sense, but p might not end up
being lowered on one’s evidence because one might know other things which entail p (cf.
Williamson , – and ). We shall set such cases aside.

Because of this, the defeatist is likely to operate with the alterna-
tive view that one’s relevant evidence includes only appearance propo-
sitions. The view we have in mind also contends that:
[the] justification you get merely by having an experience as
of p can sometimes suffice to give you knowledge that p is the
case. (Pryor , ; cf. also )
So, consider again the widgets case. On this appearances-only view of ev-
idence, your evidence by which you can initially come to know the propo-
sition that the widgets are red (“wr”) is just the proposition that the widgets
appear red (“Awr”), where presumably the advocate of this view will want
to say that
Pr (wr | Awr) > Pr (wr)
It looks, then, as though the appearances-only view of evidence does al-
low us to model defeat in terms of acquiring additional evidence that
screens off one’s initial evidence from supporting the target proposition.
For, where “red light” stands for the proposition that the widgets are being
irradiated by red lighting, it is plausible that:
Pr (wr | Awr & Ared light) ≈ Pr (wr)
Note that it won’t help to opt for a mixed picture on which one’s evidence for some
of one’s beliefs includes only appearance propositions and for some other of one’s beliefs
includes propositions not merely reporting appearances. For as long as one’s evidence is
allowed to include any propositions that are not merely about appearances, it is possible
for cases to arise in which one’s evidence for a non-appearance proposition p is itself part
of one’s evidence for p, and in such cases, adding to one’s evidence other propositions
about how one’s belief in p was formed will not do anything to diminish the probability
of p on one’s evidence.
Compare also Huemer (, §.d), who characterizes the skeptical threat in terms
of knowledge: skeptics argue that we don’t know much at all about the external world.
Huemer then claims that given his phenomenal conservatism (PC), the skeptical worry
is largely met (though he does not say PC alone can give one knowledge). Huemer must
be assuming something similar to Pryor, that undefeated appearances are sometimes
enough not only to give one prima facie justification, but to give one knowledge. Similar
views, on a natural reading, are espoused by BonJour (, –), Swinburne (, –
, ).

That is, even though the widgets appear red by itself raises the probability
that the widgets are red, the conjunction of the widgets appear red with it
appears that the widgets are being irradiated by red lighting does little to raise
the probability that the widgets are red—the probability that the widgets
are red simply reverts to (roughly) the prior probability. So far so good.
However, a view of evidence that allows subjects to conditionalize only on
appearances comes at great cost, as we shall now argue—a cost attaching
to the initial claim that conditionalizing on Awr could gain one knowledge
before encountering the defeater.
Let Ap represent the schematic proposition that it appears that p. As
has been noted elsewhere, for any proposition p, Ap does not, formally
speaking, favour p over a corresponding sceptical hypothesis (¬p & Ap),
even if one’s updating on Ap results in p being more probable than ¬p on
one’s total evidence. On a Likelihoodist account of confirmation, the Law
of Likelihood says that a piece of evidence E favours a hypothesis H over
a competing hypothesis H just in case:
(LL) Pr(E |H) > Pr(E |H)
And the three most popular accounts of non-relational Bayesian con-
firmation all have in common the following sufficient condition for
favouring, the Weak Law of Likelihood:
(WLL) E favours H over H if:
Pr(E |H) > Pr(E |H) and Pr(E | ¬H) ≤ Pr(E | ¬H)
But on either (LL) or (WLL), getting as evidence the appearance proposi-
tion Ap does not favour the hypothesis p over the hypothesis that (¬p &
Ap); this is so when one’s prior for Pr(Ap | p) = , and when one’s prior
Pr(Ap | p) < .
See, e.g., Williamson (, –).
As given by Fitelson (, ff.): . Difference: d(H, E) =df Pr(H | E)−Pr(H)
. Ratio: r(H, E) =df
Pr(H |E)
Pr(H) . Likelihood-Ratio: l(H, E) =df
Pr(E|H)
Pr(E|¬H)

First consider the case in which one’s prior probability is such that
Pr(Ap | p) = . This makes the left hand side of (LL) equal to ; but of
course, (¬p & Ap) entails Ap, meaning that Pr(Ap | ¬p & Ap) = . So on
(LL), where one’s prior probability of getting the appearance that p condi-
tional on p is , that appearance doesn’t favour p over (¬p & Ap), because
the probability on each side is ; and so that appearance is evidentially
inert when it comes to favouring p over this skeptical scenario. Because it
fails (LL), it fails to meet the sufficiency condition given by (WLL), for its
left conjunct is just (LL).
Now we consider the case where p does not entail that Ap, and thus
one’s prior Pr(Ap | p) < . For instance, the proposition that the widgets
are red does not entail that the widgets appear red, even if it makes it highly
probable. For any proposition p whose truth doesn’t entail the correspond-
ing appearance proposition Ap, conditionalizing on Ap will, given (LL),
actually favour the sceptical hypothesis (¬p & Ap) over p. Recall that for
any p, Pr(Ap | ¬p & Ap) = . So, for any p such that Pr(Ap | p) < , (LL) is
true, for:
Pr(Ap | ¬p & Ap) > Pr(Ap | p)
But given that prior, (LL) says that not only does getting Ap fail to favour
p over the skeptical hypothesis, but it actually favours the skeptical hy-
pothesis over p.
What about (WLL)? We noted above that where one’s prior was  for
Pr(Ap | p), (LL) fails because the Pr(Ap | ¬p & Ap) is also . So all the more
so will it fail the left conjunct of (WLL) when one’s prior Pr(Ap | p) ≤ . For
what is needed is that it be greater than Pr(Ap | ¬p & Ap), which equals
. But since it can’t be greater than , this scenario cannot meet (WLL)’s
sufficiency condition for Bayesian favouring.
White () makes such a point, in reply to Pryor ().
We grant that its failure to meet this sufficient condition doesn’t show that there is no
Bayesian account of confirmation on which updating on appearances does favour p over
its corresponding skeptical hypothesis. But for each of Difference, Ratio, and Likelihood-
Ratio from fn. , there are hypotheses and priors on which appearances fail to favor the

In sum then, the worst case scenario is that one’s appearances confirm
the sceptical hypothesis over the proposition said to be appeared-to; the
best case scenario, if one contends that Pr(Ap | p) = , is that the evidence
from appearances is evidentially inert in the sense that its appearing to
one that p raises the probability of p as much, proportionately, as it does
the hypothesis that one is misleadingly appeared-to that p. (Again, these
results about evidential confirmation hold even if one’s probability for p
ends up higher than one’s probability for ¬p when updating on Ap.) And
the problem is that it seems, in either scenario, that one wouldn’t gain
knowledge that p in the first place purely on the basis of update on an
appearance proposition.
Thus internalist defeatists tend to hold two claims which are in ten-
sion with each other, namely (i) that the possibility of defeat requires that
one conditionalize only upon appearance propositions, and (ii) that condi-
tionalization upon an appearance proposition can suffice for one to know
the proposition appeared-to (Pryor op. cit.). Such internalists owe us a
story about how knowledge can be gained in the first place when one’s
initial evidence confirms a skeptical hypothesis as much or more than the
appeared-to, and purportedly known, proposition. (That story will likely
appeal to a probability threshold of less than  for knowledge. But such a
story has serious drawbacks. It will predict that if one’s prior probability
for p began high enough, one can know p even after updating on evidence
which lowers p’s probability, so long as it is above the threshold. And if
so, it is committed to one being able to know even after updating on a
defeater.)
target hypothesis over its corresponding skeptical hypothesis; and so we are pessimistic
that there is an account of Bayesian confirmation which secures the internalist defeatist
all that she wants. (For similar pessimism, see Pryor .)
Suppose you begin with a credence well above (say) . that lottery ticket t will lose,
because you’ve been told that t is part of a , ticket lottery; on this threshold picture
of knowledge, you know t will lose. But if I then tell you it’s in fact a  ticket lottery,
your probability that t will lose goes down, and in that sense you have a defeater; but
you’re still above the threshold, so you know in the presence of a defeater.

 Problems for Externalist Defeatists
We suggested in the last section that there are problems with internal-
ist notions of defeat where knowledge is thought to be gained merely by
updating on appearances, at least if defeat is modelled on a Bayesian prob-
abilistic framework. That alone might lead one to embrace an externalism
on which gaining knowledge merely requires some reliable or safe (etc.)
belief-forming process.
For externalists about justification, however, simply adducing an inter-
nalist no-defeat condition on knowledge (or justification) is not an attrac-
tive option. Doing so results in a gerrymandered picture of knowledge (or
justification) that includes an internalist defeat condition bearing no con-
nection with the deep structural feature that they, qua externalists, take to
be characteristic of knowledge (e.g. safety, sensitivity, track-record relia-
bility, aptness).
But might there be a way to account for the alleged loss of knowledge
that occurs in defeat cases by appeal to straightforwardly externalist con-
siderations having to do with a belief’s objective connection to the world?
If a plausible story could be told about how acquiring defeating evidence
always brings it about that the target belief no longer counts as meeting
various externalist candidate conditions on knowledge then externalists
of various stripes could happily accommodate defeat without any need for
co-opting what are basically internalist ways of thinking about defeat. But
we now want to try to show that various purely externalist (non-hybrid)
approaches might attempt to model defeat are highly problematic.
. Method-switching: externalist method individuation
We begin, in this section and the next, by considering a strategy that might
be termed method-switching.
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio () suggests that a natural thought about
how externalists might try to accommodate defeat is that acquiring de-
See Greco (, Chap. ) for the dilemma faced by externalists here.

feating evidence always brings it about that a subject’s belief counts as
being causally sustained by a method that is unreliable. The basic idea
with method-switching is that in a case in which a subject holds a belief
that was originally the product of a reliable method, the acquisition of
defeating evidence for that belief brings it about that what counts as the
salient method that is sustaining the target belief switches to a method that
is unreliable. The method-switching strategy could in principle be tried
with any of the various externalist conditions on knowledge that relativize
epistemic reliability to a given method of belief-formation: namely, track-
record (i.e. truth-ratio) reliability, sensitivity, and safety. An important
decision point for theorists who employ one of these conditions in their
account of knowledge is the issue of whether to individuate belief-forming
methods internalistically, (that is, as supervening upon the mental states
of the subject), or rather, in terms of facts about the method producing and
sustaining the subject’s belief that go beyond the mental states of the sub-
ject. We can call the former approach to method-individuation internalist
and the latter externalist. Ultimately we think that method-switching fails
given either approach, but for different reasons in each case.
Let’s start with externalist method-individuation. As Lasonen-Aarnio
argues, the basic difficulty with the method-switching strategy where
methods are individuated in terms of the actual facts about how the sub-
ject’s belief is sustained is that it is simply not plausible that in all defeat
cases the subject counts as having her belief sustained by a method that is
unreliable. If the belief was initially the product of a reliable method, then
how could acquiring misleading evidence that the belief was unreliably
formed turn that belief into the product of an unreliable method? Presum-
ably, the answer will have to be that the presence of defeating evidence—
albeit misleading—is something that should enter into the characterisa-
tion of the method via which the subject’s belief is sustained. So, for in-
stance, suppose that a subject with normal vision observes a red widget
under ordinary lighting conditions and comes to believe that the widget is
red. The salient method might initially be something like normal vision in
good lighting at close proximity. This is a method with a good track record

(a high truth-ratio), and it is also a method that couldn’t easily have led
the subject to believe in a relevantly similar falsehood in nearby worlds;
furthermore, the subject wouldn’t have believed that the widget is red by
way of that method in the nearest world in which the widget isn’t red.
The subject’s belief formed via this method is sensitive, safe, and reliably
formed. Suppose then that the subject acquires misleading evidence that
the widgets are being irradiated by red lighting that would make widgets
of any colour appear red. The thought, then, would be that in light of the
acquisition of this defeating evidence, the salient method now becomes
one whose description includes the presence of defeating evidence. We
think that there are serious problems with this thought, however.
To begin with, we take it that the characterisation of the salient method
that a subject uses in continuing to believe a given proposition ought to re-
flect the factors that are actually causally operative in sustaining the belief
in question. Obviously there are tricky and unresolved issues about how
much detail should be included in the description of the salient method in
a given case, but still, it seems that we should not include facts that make
no causal contribution to the sustenance of the target belief. We shouldn’t,
for instance, include in the characterisation of the visual method by which
I believe that it is raining outside such irrelevances as that it is a Friday or
that Barack Obama is currently the US president. But then, why should
we include the presence of defeating evidence in the characterisation of
the salient method in a defeat case if the subject in that case is so dogmat-
ically disposed that the presence of the defeating evidence has no impact
at all upon the psychological processes that continue to sustain her belief?
It isn’t a satisfactory answer to this question simply to point out that we
need to include the presence of defeating evidence in our characterisation
of the salient method in such cases in order to explain why the subjects in
such cases lose knowledge.
Something the defeatist might try instead is to include disregarding ev-
idence that one’s belief is false/unreliably formed in the description of the
This is also the approach taken by Becker () and Goldman ().

method which sustains the belief of a dogmatist who refuses to heed de-
feating evidence. Perhaps there is a better case to be made for includ-
ing this factor in the description of the method than there is for includ-
ing the mere presence of defeating evidence. At any rate, counterfactual
theories of causation will tend to count disregarding evidence of fal-
sity/unreliability as being causally relevant to the sustenance of a belief,
because it will (usually) be true that if the subject had not disregarded
such evidence then she would not have to continued to hold the target
belief. But this thought will not ultimately be of help to the defeatist.
For one thing, it is clear that the mere fact that one disregards evidence
of the falsity or unreliability of one’s belief is not always sufficient to bring
it about that one ought to drop one’s belief. Think of cases in which one is
told that one is not cold, contrary to how one is feeling. Surely no one will
want to claim that one ought to drop one’s belief in all such cases. The les-
son here is that it will not do to describe the method in so coarse-grained
a manner; rather, the method needs to be described in a way that makes
reference to the nature of the counterevidence and the circumstances in
which one encounters it.
But even still, it is not actually clear how including in the description of
the new sustaining method the fact that one disregards counterevidence
(of a certain sort and under certain conditions) will succeed in securing
the defeatist’s desired result: namely that in all such cases the sustaining
method is unreliable (or unsafe, etc.). For whether the misleading charac-
ter of that evidence is included in the description, or whether it is left out
of the description, there can be cases where the new (sustaining) method
is also safe, sensitive, or reliable as the original belief-formation method—
not the result that the defeatist wants. That is, for many safe, sensi-
Thanks to John Hawthorne for suggesting this epicycle.
Cf. Lewis (a; ), Paul ().
We omit discussion of cases in which the defeating evidence is non-misleading for
the simple reason that in those cases the method by which the belief was initially formed
was indeed unreliable, and so the subject will not count as knowing in the first place.
The difficult cases for the reliabilist defeatist are those in which the subject starts out
knowing but subsequently encounters misleading evidence suggesting that her belief is

tive, or reliable belief-forming methods M, the corresponding method M,
namely M whilst disregarding defeating evidence pertaining to M, is about as
safe, sensitive, or reliable as M. Beliefs formed (and sustained) by normal
vision under conditions of good lighting at close proximity can be just as
safe, reliable, and sensitive as those formed (and sustained) by normal vi-
sion under conditions of good lighting at close proximity in the presence
of evidence that the lighting is not good.
. Method-switching: internalist method individuation
To individuate methods internally, recall, is to individuate them in terms
of how it seems to the subject “from the inside,” so to speak, that she is
forming her beliefs. At a first pass an internalist approach to method indi-
viduation might appear to make things go more smoothly for the theorist
who wishes to employ the method-switching strategy in order to accom-
modate defeat within an externalist picture of knowledge. It would be
implausible, however, to claim simply that the method that a subject em-
ploys in forming and sustaining a belief is to be characterised in terms of
how it seems to the subject that she is forming her belief. For this view
would incorrectly classify as knowledge a whole range of cases in which
the subject is misled into thinking that her beliefs are being formed in a
manner that is reliable, safe, and sensitive when in fact the causal process
that are responsible for generating and sustaining her beliefs are neither
reliable, safe, nor sensitive.
A more promising approach might invoke internalist method individ-
false or unreliably formed, hence our focus on such cases.
Of course, there is the non-trivial matter that individuating methods in an internalist
fashion sits uncomfortably with an otherwise externalist approach to epistemology. We
will set that aside for now, however.
On this approach it will be extremely hard to diagnose what goes wrong in Gettier
cases, since the subjects in Gettier cases by hypothesis take themselves to be employing
knowledge-conducive methods (otherwise, we take it, epistemologists would not be in-
clined to judge, as almost all in fact do, that the subjects in Gettier cases satisfy a range
of internalist conditions on knowledge). For more on the difficulties with internalistic
method individuation see Williamson (, –) and Pritchard (, –).
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uation when the subject undergoes method-switching: the idea here is that
externalist factors themselves individuate the method in general, but once
it becomes plausible to a subject that her prior method of belief forma-
tion (or of suspending judgment) was different from what she had taken
it to be, it comes to matter what method she takes herself to be switching
to. So if a subject undergoes a switch in methods, it matters epistemically
whether the method to which she thinks she is switching is (un)reliable.
The internalist method-switcher contends that it not only matters that the
new method be reliable, but also that the subject rightly takes the method
used to be reliable. This approach gives a unified treatment to cases where
a subject goes from using an unreliable method to using (what they take
to be) a reliable one, and cases where one goes from a reliable method to
using (what they take to be) an unreliable one.
Take a subject Sue who begins with flawed testimony that it is rain-
ing outside, which Sue regards (wrongly) as reliable in her context, and
she believes this testimony. But Sue later comes to learn that it is rain-
ing through direct observation of the rain, and also to learn that the tes-
timony she had received was mere hearsay; and Sue (rightly) takes her
visual method to be reliable. As a result, Sue switches from the method
of believing on the basis of (flawed) testimony, to believing on what she
takes to be adequate perceptual grounds; Sue seems to gain knowledge.
Or take Tom, who forms the belief that a carnival procession is going
past his house by looking out of the window and observing the carnival
floats going by. Tom believes (or assumes) that his belief is formed under
favourable lighting conditions and that he is under the influence of no im-
pairing substances. But Tom’s friend Lisa subsequently tells Tom, albeit
entirely misleadingly, that she slipped LSD into his tea earlier, and Tom
accepts this. Since Tom now thinks that he formed his belief under the
influence of LSD, the method that counts as salient is indeed a method
whose description includes vision under the influence of LSD. Presumably
this new method is neither reliable, safe, nor sensitive, and assuming that
Cf. Nozick (, ).
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at least one of these conditions is necessary for knowledge, Tom’s belief, if
he continues to hold it, therefore ceases to count as knowledge.
One drawback of this approach is that it permits cases in which a
subject is wrong in significant ways about what new method she has
switched to, but right that the new method she takes herself to be using is
(un)reliable. Imagine that Sue, in a slight modification of the above case,
comes to learn that it is raining not through directly observing the rain
out a window, but by instead seeing outside her window a highly realistic
video of the rain falling outside. Sue thinks her method is direct obser-
vation of the rain, but it is not; nevertheless, the video-mediated route to
seeing the rain is as reliable as having seen it directly. Intuitions may be
murky here, but we suspect that a defeatist who likes both externalism
and an internalist approach to method-switching will intuitively judge
Sue not to know, even though their view (as roughly formulated above)
predicts that Sue knows. Even in a case where a subject switches from
one reliable method to what she takes to be another reliable one—e.g., in
Sue’s case had her initial testimony been reliable, and then she came to
believe that it is raining by seeing the video of the rain while thinking she
is directly seeing the rain—we suspect there may be diverging intuitions
about whether the subject continues to know. For if one’s internal view on
one’s method matters epistemically, there may be pressure to think that
this internal view must be getting things largely correct.
. Defeating evidence as a determinant of which cases
are close
One way of spelling out the notion of epistemic safety is in terms of the
avoidance of error in all sufficiently close cases. A case is simply an
instance of forming, withholding, or continuing to hold a belief. The idea,
then, is that one knows in a case α only if there is no case sufficiently
close to α in which one believes falsely. The closeness of a pair of cases is
Williamson () often states his safety condition for knowledge in just these terms.
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determined by a variety of factors, some of which weigh more heavily than
others. Similarity of belief etiology—that is, the similarity of the token
causal processes responsible for the generating, sustaining, or dropping of
belief in the two cases—is usually thought to rank as the most important
determinant of the closeness of a pair of cases alongside modal distance,
i.e., the extent to which the world as a whole (not just the aspects of it that
are directly relevant to the production of the target belief) differs between
the two cases. On this way of construing safety, then, the reason that a
case in which one is an envatted brain being fed misleading appearances
will not count as being sufficiently close to a case in which one is forming
perceptual beliefs in the ordinary way is that the token causal processes
by which one’s beliefs arise differs sharply between the two cases, and
moreover, that the world as a whole (including aspects of it not directly
relevant to the production of one’s beliefs) differs significantly between
the two cases.
Hawthorne (, –) has suggested that this picture could be
augmented so as to accommodate defeat. In addition to the aforemen-
tioned determinants of closeness, the closeness of a pair of cases might
also, in part, be determined by the similarity of the subject’s experiences.
Consider a case in which you competently perform a calculation using a
fully working calculator and get the correct answer. Plausibly there are no
cases of error that are sufficiently close to this case in the respects men-
tioned earlier, and so your belief counts as safe. Suppose, however, that
some time later Devious Dave tells you (albeit entirely misleadingly) that
the calculator has a wiring defect such that it churns out mistaken answers
half of the time. In line with Hawthorne’s suggestion, the fact that you
undergo this experience involving Dave’s testimony makes a difference to
which cases count as close. In particular, other cases in which you undergo
the same experience (the one involving Dave’s testimony) will now count
as sufficiently close to the target case, and some of those other cases, so the
thought goes, will be ones in which the calculator’s wiring really is faulty
so that you end up believing falsehoods. Hence, your belief is no longer
safe.

A significant worry about this proposal concerns the degree to which
it requires that similarity of experiences be privileged above similarity of
belief etiology in determining closeness of cases. Suppose you are witness-
ing the Northern Lights using ordinary unimpaired vision and so form the
belief that you are witnessing the Northern Lights. You subsequently re-
ceive misleading testimony from a seemingly trustworthy neuroscientist
to the effect that you are currently under the influence of a hallucinogenic
substance. Now, assuming the defeatist wants to classify this as a case
of defeat, the modified safety-theoretic proposal under consideration can
explain your (alleged) loss of knowledge only by insisting that your un-
dergoing the experience of being told that you are under the influence of
said substance brings sufficiently close a range of cases in which you un-
dergo the same experience (being told that by the neuroscientist) and in
which you really are under the influence of such a substance, and hence
are forming false beliefs. And in order for this to work, very little weight
indeed must be given to the great dissimilarities in belief etiology between
the target case (which involves ordinary unimpaired visual processes) and
those cases in which your vision is seriously impaired by a hallucinogenic
substance. But an approach which so radically prioritises similarity of ex-
periences as the key determinant of closeness threatens unpalatable scep-
tical results. For if similarity of experiences is given such great weight
in determining closeness of cases then it becomes very difficult to explain
why radically sceptical scenarios don’t threaten the everyday perceptual
beliefs of subjects living in non-deceptive worlds. After all, there are pos-
sible worlds with brains in vats who undergo exactly the same experiences
as we do.
Another concern is that this modified safety proposal will presumably
predict that one’s knowledge is defeated even when one is told something
which is obviously false; recall the case where one is told that one is not
cold, contrary to what one knows about how one feels. The modified safety
proposal will have to ensure that it defeats knowledge only in cases of
intuitive defeat; but as articulated, it overgeneralises this result.

. Alternative reliable processes
According to an externalist approach to modelling defeat presented by
Alvin Goldman (), S’s belief that p is defeated if (and only if) S has
available to her an alternative reliable process which is such that had she
employed that process in addition to the one she actually used, then she
would not have continued to believe that p. This account has two features:
first, the alternative process must itself be reliable at getting one true be-
liefs (were one to use it), and second, it must be such that were one to
employ it after forming a belief that p, one would drop the belief that p.
A case will help us to get clearer on the proposal here. Suppose that
Jane comes to believe that the bank opens on Saturday as a result of Sarah’s
testimony, but suppose that subsequently Tom confidently tells Jane that
Sarah is mistaken and that the bank has very recently changed its open-
ing hours; and that believing on the basis of Tom’s testimony is a reliable
process such that were Jane to believe him, she’d (normally) have a true
belief. Suppose further that Jane is disinclined to listen to Tom and sticks
to her belief that the bank is open on Saturday. Many will want to say that
Jane has a defeater for her belief. On Goldman’s account, the reason Jane
gets a defeater for her belief is that she has available to her an alternative
reliable process, the one involving Tom’s testimony, such that if she had
used that process—i.e. if she had listened to Tom—she would have ceased
to believe that the bank is open on Saturday.
Now, it is important to note that on Goldman’s account an alternative
process is available to a subject in the relevant sense only if employing that
process doesn’t involve engaging in any further research. Goldman says:
[I]t seems implausible to say all “available” processes ought to
be used, at least if we include such processes as gathering new
evidence. Surely a belief can sometimes be justified even if
additional evidence-gathering would yield a different doxastic
attitude. What I think we should have in mind here are such
additional processes as calling previously acquired evidence to
mind, assessing the implications of that evidence, etc. (Gold-

man )
So, suppose that Jane could have consulted a third friend, John, who hap-
pens to work at the bank, but that Jane in fact hasn’t done so. Since she
would have to do more than merely consult her memory in order to ascer-
tain John’s answer to the question of whether the bank is open on Saturday,
the process involving John’s testimony is not available to Jane in the sense
Goldman intends. The process involving Tom’s testimony, on the other
hand, is available to Jane in the relevant sense: Jane merely has to consult
her memory concerning what Tom said about whether the bank is open on
Saturday.
Bob Beddor () has recently presented counterexamples to both
the necessity and sufficiency of this alternative reliable process account
of defeat. But we see two additional flaws with Goldman’s account. The
first difficulty arises from cases where intuitively defeating evidence is ac-
quired but is misleading because it is the result of an unreliable process.
Consider again the case involving Jane’s reliably formed belief about
the opening times of the bank. Goldman’s explanation for why Jane gets
a defeater will be that Tom has made available to Jane an alternative reli-
able process which is such that if Jane employs that process (in addition
to the one she in fact used) then she will cease to believe that the bank
opens on Saturday. Now, given that truth-reliability is a matter of yielding
true belief most of the time, a token process needs to be classified under a
salient type in order for there to be an answer to the question of whether
a given belief was formed in a reliable manner. Even setting aside the
question of whether there is some principled solution to the generality
problem, we can see that Goldman’s way of modelling defeat won’t work
if we classify the process Tom makes available to Jane under so coarse a
type as testimony; for the token process involving Sarah’s testimony, which
Jane actually used, will also get classified under the type testimony. And
Hence reliabilism faces the notorious generality problem concerning which of the
indefinitely many types exemplified by any given token process is the one under which
we are to classify that token for the purposes of ascertaining reliability. For a canonical
statement of the problem see Conee and Feldman ().
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so asking what would have happened had Jane used the process type tes-
timony will get the result that she would still have believed that the bank
is open on Saturday. That is, on the usual Lewis-Stalnaker procedure for
evaluating counterfactuals, the way to determine the answer to the ques-
tion “If Jane had employed the process type testimony, would she still have
believed that the bank is open on Saturday?” is to consider whether Jane
continues to believe that the bank is open on Saturday in the nearest world
in which she employs the process type testimony. Well, Jane uses that pro-
cess type in the actual world (i.e., in receiving the initial testimony from
Sarah); the actual world is the nearest world to itself; and in the actual
world Jane doesn’t drop the belief that the bank is open on Saturday.
What is clear, then, is that token processes need to be assigned to nar-
rower types for Goldman’s approach to get the right result—namely, that
the alternative process would, if used by Jane, have led her to drop the
target belief. Let’s see how things look when we classify the token process
that Tom makes available to Jane under a slightly narrower type. What
we need, it seems, is to individuate testimonial process types in a way that
distinguishes between particular testifiers. The type to which we assign
the process made available to Jane by Tom needs to be something at least
as narrow as Tom’s testimony. If we ask whether Jane continues to believe
that the bank is open on Saturday in the nearest world in which Jane em-
ploys the narrower process type Tom’s testimony—rather than the nearest
world in which Jane uses testimony more generally—the answer clearly
seems to be yes—the desired result. The problem now, though, is that it
is easy to fill out the details of the case in such a way that the type Tom’s
testimony is not itself a reliable one (were Jane to believe his testimony),
so that Goldman’s (first) condition for defeat is no longer satisfied; yet the
intuition that Jane ought to drop her belief persists. We might modify the
case to say that, unbeknownst to Jane, Tom is a habitual liar, or is fond
of practical jokes and enjoys deliberately misleading people. Under these
conditions it is obvious that Tom’s testimony is not a reliable process type,
See Lewis (b) and Stalnaker ().
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and yet, since we are stipulating that Jane has no reason to suspect such
nefarious behaviour on Tom’s part, it remains intuitive that Jane ought
to drop her belief that the bank opens on Saturday upon receiving Tom’s
confident testimony to the contrary. We take it that this will be just as
much of a problem if one classifies the process that Tom makes available
to Jane under any type that is even narrower than Tom’s testimony—for in-
stance, types such as Tom’s testimony concerning practical matters or Tom’s
testimony concerning bank opening times. It will be just as easy to fill out
the details of the case in such a way that any of these narrower types is
unreliable, and so won’t count as alternative reliable processes available
to Jane, and yet the intuition will still persist that Jane ought to drop her
belief that the bank opens on Saturday upon receiving Tom’s confident
testimony to the contrary.
The other difficulty we see with Goldman’s account is that it fails to
deliver intuitively correct results concerning cases in which subjects do
not happen to be disposed to drop the target belief upon employing an al-
ternative reliable process that is available to them. Consider Pollock’s red
widget case again. On a tour of a factory John observes a red widget and
comes to believe that it is red. A worker informs John, however, that the
widgets are irradiated by red light as part of a quality control procedure,
but John stubbornly sticks to his original belief. Now, suppose that the
worker’s testimony can plausibly be classified under a highly reliable pro-
cess type. Still, it is perfectly possible that John is so disposed that even if
he had employed the reliable process made available to him by the factory
worker—i.e. even if he had accepted the factory worker’s testimony and
thereby come to believe that the widgets are being irradiated by red light—
he would not have dropped the belief that the widget is red. As it happens
most human beings are cognitively wired up so as to drop beliefs in cir-
cumstances in which we come to think that those beliefs were improperly
formed, but that is a thoroughly metaphysically contingent matter. Gold-
man’s account of defeat is unable to say what John is doing wrong, since
it is not true of John that any alternative reliable process available to him
is such that were he to use that process, he would drop the belief that the

widget is red. Since at best it can only get the correct results concerning
cases involving subjects with “normal” cognitive dispositions, Goldman’s
account lacks the normative universalizability that an account of defeat
should be able to deliver up.
. Suspension of belief as proper functioning in defeat
cases
A proper functionalist about externalist justification (or warrant) might
want to appeal to the idea that cases of defeat are ones wherein a properly
functioning epistemic agent just would, when becoming apprised of the
presence of a defeater, drop the relevant belief. Alvin Plantinga, the fore-
most proponent of proper functionalism in epistemology, takes this sort
of approach to handling defeat:
You read in a usually reliable guidebook that the University of
Aberdeen was founded in  A.D.; you form the belief that
it was founded then; that belief has a certain degree of warrant
for you. You later read in an authoritative history of Aberdeen
that the university was founded in ; you now no longer
believe that it was founded in , and (as we may put it) the
warrant that belief had for you has been defeated. If things are
going properly, you will no longer believe the first proposition,
and will perhaps not believe the second as firmly as you would
have, had you not first believed the first. Plantinga (, –
)
Proper functionalists might cash out the notion of what is epistemi-
cally proper in defeating circumstances in terms of what that agent herself
would do, counterfactually speaking, if she were apprised of a defeater; or
perhaps it is glossed in terms of what most normal cognitive agents in fact
do in similar circumstances, and so proper function is delivered up by the
statistical norm for such cognitive populations. Once this idea is in hand,
the proper functionalist claims that subjects should drop the belief once

apprised of a defeater for it, and this is how a defeater does its defeating
work: roughly, because one functions properly in the face of a defeater
for one’s belief that p only if one, in response to that defeater, drops one’s
belief that p, it must be that one fails to function properly if one contin-
ues to believe that p in the face of a defeater for that belief. And if one
fails to function properly in such circumstances (if one does not do as one
epistemically should), one thereby lacks epistemic justification.
This approach to handling defeat within a proper function externalist
framework comes with several costs. First, if it appeals to proper function
in order to generate the notion of a normative defeater, then it owes us an
account of what is proper about dropping a belief in the face of a (poten-
tial) defeater; and providing such an account cannot, on pain of circularity,
appeal to intuitions about defeat cases, for those are the intuitions being
explained.
Second, providing an adequate gloss on what proper function is in
such cases looks to be a tall order. Take the counterfactual idea sketched
above. Suppose it is true of you that, though you now know that p on the
basis of E, your dispositions are such that were you to be apprised of a
true proposition D which calls into question E’s support for p, you would
thereby drop your belief and suspend judgment on p. Leaving some de-
tails aside, this might seem a nice start to an account of why the truth
of D, even if you don’t learn that D, could prevent you from knowing that
p. But it does not predict that some other agent, who is similarly evi-
dentially situated but is not counterfactually disposed to drop her belief
E.g., in Bergmann’s Jpf account (, ), the defeat that would’ve obtained by
way of clause (i), namely taking one’s belief to be defeated, is achieved by clause (iia), by
(no longer) functioning properly, since one should take one’s belief to be defeated. For
discussion of Plantinga’s approach, see Kvanvig .
See Bergmann (, ) for an illustration of this. (In what follows we consider
two attempts at the needed proper functionalist account, and reject them both as im-
plausible.)
Such as: won’t this be a much too strong notion of defeat? For in a wide range of
cases, there might always be available some truth which would lead you to drop your
belief (for example, learning that someone else believes differently than you do on the
matter). Similar worries apply, mutatis mutandis, to Goldman-style appeals to alternative
available conditionally reliable processes (see §. above).
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that p upon learning that D, has her knowledge defeated. In other words,
if defeat is packaged in terms of an individual’s cognitive dispositions to
respond to new information, it loses normative universalizability: defeat
merely turns on one’s own cognitive dispositions.
Or take the statistical norm idea, which glosses defeat in terms of what
most (suitably similar) cognitive agents in fact do in similar circumstances
when apprised of defeating truths. On this approach, proper function
is understood as how most such cognitive agents do function. An obvious
problem with this way of proceeding is that it makes one’s view hostage
to empirical fortune: if it turns out that most (suitably similar) cognitive
agents who form the belief that the widgets are red continue so to believe
even after being told that there are red lights illuminating them, then such
a proper function account must allow that such beliefs are not defeated.
. Defeated beliefs as inapt performances
Finally, we turn to consider whether the prospects for an externalist ac-
count of defeat might be better relative to a virtue-theoretic version of
epistemic externalism. An increasingly prominent externalist account of
knowledge is that of so-called virtue reliabilists such as Ernest Sosa (;
) and John Greco (). The basic insight here is that knowledge is in
some sense an achievement that is the result of exercising one’s cognitive
abilities, or intellectual virtues. For example, according to Sosa, belief is
We are simplifying and idealizing, assuming that such an account could provide
a plausible way of defining the similarity metrics for cognitive ability and for circum-
stances.
It is widely held that there are in fact two sorts of virtue epistemologists, who are
divided principally by their views on the nature of intellectual virtues. Virtue reliabilists
such as Greco and Sosa think of intellectual virtues as including various sub-personal
cognitive processes of which the subject may not be reflectively aware and for which she
need not be able to take responsibility. Virtue responsibilists such as Zagzebski ()
and Baehr (), by contrast, understand intellectual virtues not in terms of reliable
cognitive faculties, but rather, in terms of person-level traits or habits of a certain sort.
Examples of such traits might be things like open-mindedness, conscientiousness, intel-
lectual honesty, self-awareness, love of the truth, intellectual courage, intellectual humil-
ity, and so on. It seems that this latter construal of intellectual virtues with its emphasis

like other performances in that it can be evaluated along the dimensions
of accuracy, adroitness (how competently formed), and aptness: whether
the belief (performance) is accurate because adroit. Knowledge, then, is
apt belief: belief that is accurate because it is adroitly formed.
But as with other types of externalism adumbrated above, it is unclear
how gaining would-be defeating evidence would render an already apt
belief inapt. That is, gaining evidence that your performance was inapt
is not itself enough to make your performance inapt; likewise gaining
evidence that you don’t know may not itself be enough to make one not
know. One might suppose that sustaining an initially aptly formed belief
in the face of defeating evidence amounts to a kind of incompetence; for
one might argue that the new performance of maintaining belief in light of
defeating evidence renders one’s ongoing and overall performance inapt,
and that this is so because one is (in Sosa’s terminology) in the position of
thinking, at the reflective level, that one’s animal belief that p may have
been inapt. Perhaps one lacks reflective knowledge (apt metabelief) even
though one may have begun with apt animal belief. But nothing in the
virtue framework requires that one have reflective knowledge in order to
have animal knowledge; likewise, nothing in the virtue approach renders
inapt an apt belief just because one encounters misleading evidence.
 Knowledge-Centered Epistemic Rationality
The foregoing argued that there are multiple concerns about implement-
ing an account of defeat on either internalist or externalist frameworks.
on intellectual responsibility is committed to viewing knowledge as requiring some kind
of reflective access to the processes by which one’s belief is formed, and hence, this latter
approach is reasonably taken to be offering a broadly internalist account of knowledge.
Virtue responsibilists might thus be able to accommodate defeat into their picture of
knowledge; but they also might merely have the resources for explaining why knowl-
edge, under putative defeat conditions, counts as “unreasonable” in Lasonen-Aarnio’s
() sense.
Compare a performer impersonating a well-known figure; the performance might be
apt despite the heckling critics who jeer it as an inaccurate portrayal of the celebrity (and
those criticisms need not make the impersonator discontinue his performance).

In what follows we sketch a positive proposal about how to accommodate
judgments about defeat, on a knowledge-centric picture of epistemic ra-
tionality.
. Primary norms and derived norms
Suppose that you take yourself to be bound by a norm stating that
(R) One must: stop one’s car if there is a red traffic light ahead
Presumably this is a norm by which all automobile drivers are actually
expected to abide. Of course, sometimes drivers fail to obey this norm
and yet their violation of it is blameless in a certain sense. Suppose that a
tree is obscuring the traffic light column from view so that I fail to notice
the red light and sail past obliviously. Despite violating the primary norm
there is a sense in which I am not to blame.
We might try to account for that sense by appealing to a second norm,
one that is derived from the primary norm:
(Ra) One must: stop one’s car if one accepts or believes that
there is a red traffic light ahead.
It is because I was prepared to abide by Ra, in attempt to conform to R,
that I am in some sense blameless (or less blameworthy) in violating R. But
in what sense is Ra derived from R? In the following sense: trying to fol-
low a norm whilst simultaneously doing (or continuing to do) something
which one takes to be in violation of it is irrational. It follows that trying
rationally to follow a norm stating that one must φ only in conditions C in-
volves trying to refrain from or stop (what one thinks is) φ-ing whenever
one thinks that one is not in C.
Let us now suppose that belief is governed by a primary epistemic
norm KNB: One must: believe that p only if one knows that p. This is
Williamson (, , –), Adler (), Sutton (, ), Huemer (,
), Sosa (, –), Littlejohn (), among others. See Benton (, §) for
discussion. We won’t be arguing for KNB here; our aim is to show how KNB can be put
to work.

formulation is equivalent to:
(KNB) One must: not believe that p if one does not know that p.
KNB is the primary norm of epistemic permissibility, from which a guid-
ance norm may be derived:
(KNBa) One must: refrain from believing p if one comes
to believe or accept that one’s belief that p is not
knowledge.
KNBa is not an iteration principle on which one must judge all one’s be-
liefs to be knowledge (and thus there is no threat of a normative KK prin-
ciple). Rather, KNBa offers guidance for responsibly conforming to KNB,
and is derived from KNB as follows. KNB provides a necessary condition
on the epistemic permissibility of belief. One who accepts KNB (implic-
itly or explicitly) will judge that if any actual or potential belief of theirs
is epistemically impermissible by not being knowledge, it should not be
believed. So KNBa codifies the idea that one must refrain from doing that
which one believes or accepts, given KNB, to be impermissible. This is a
fully general result: for any norm on which one should φ only in condi-
tions C, accepting that norm and coming to believe that one is not in C
gives one sufficient reason to refrain from φ-ing.
Given KNB and its derivative KNBa, we can explain why it would seem
epistemically irrational or irresponsible for subjects in so-called defeat
cases to maintain their beliefs. For paradigmatic cases of defeat are ones
in which one comes to believe or accept that one’s belief isn’t knowledge,
and if so, one is in violation of KNBa. Insofar as implicit acceptance of
Cf. Williamson (,  and ); for a similar derivation from the norm of as-
sertion, see Benton (forthcomingb). DeRose (, –) draws a distinction between
primary propriety and secondary propriety. Consider a norm stating that one must: φ in
conditions C. Primary propriety consists in φ-ing whenever one is in fact in C. Secondary
propriety, on the other hand, consists in φ-ing whenever one takes oneself to be in C.

KNB carries with it an implicit commitment to KNBa, that is enough to
generate the judgment that there is something problematic about belief
in the presence of a defeater. This puts flesh on the bones of the intu-
itive idea that subjects who continue to believe in cases of putative defeat
are genuinely criticizable: not only is it the case that such believers “fail
to follow policies that it is rational for someone with the goal of acquir-
ing knowledge... to adopt” (Lasonen-Aarnio , ). Such believers
also violate derivative norms of belief which are instrumental means to
fulfilling the primary epistemic norm of belief. Thus our approach differs
from Lasonen-Aarnio’s by not locating what is criticizable or unreasonable
about maintaining belief in the face of putative defeat information simply
in terms of one’s epistemic policies or habits which, in the long run, will
yield non-knowledge (including false beliefs); our proposal of epistemic
rationality in terms of KNBa locates the source of such criticizability in
violating KNBa.
Routinely violating KNBa might manifest a bad epistemic policy or
habit which would be bad given the goal of knowledge or even true be-
lief, and if so it would coincide with Lasonen-Aarnio’s account. But on our
approach, dismissing putative defeating information as evidentially irrel-
evant will keep one from violating KNBa, even though it might manifest
the bad habit which Lasonen-Aarnio thinks of as criticizable. We suspect
that whether this in fact manifests a bad habit will depend on how often
it leads one to violate KNB itself: for if one is in the long run very good
at retaining knowledge in such situations, it might manifest a good epis-
temic habit. Whether one tends to retain knowledge in such situations
will figure in whether one is manifesting a good or bad epistemic habit.
Significantly though, our explanation (and Lasonen-Aarnio’s) of intuitive
judgments about cases of defeat is consistent with those beliefs continuing
in some instances to constitute knowledge, if they were knowledge to be-
gin with: one can violate KNBa without violating KNB itself, because one
can be wrong about whether one knows.
Note also that KNB and KNBa together enable an error-theory of why
some might deny multi-premise closure. For one who knows each of p and

q and r... and n might also refrain from believing the conjunction (p & q &
r... & n), because one believes that one does not know the conjunction; and
given KNBa, one does refrain from believing the conjunction. So accep-
tance of KNBa can explain why one might inclined to deny multi-premise
closure, even if multi-premise closure holds.
As we noted earlier, defeatists tend to think of defeaters as coming
in several varieties. Doxastic defeaters typically divide into undercutting
and rebutting varieties. Let’s begin with undercutting defeat.
. Undercutting defeat
In cases of putative undercutting defeat, a subject who acquires such de-
feating information acquires evidence that their target belief is not an item
of knowledge. When one acquires evidence that renders it improbable
that you know that p such that one thereby comes to believe or accept that
one doesn’t know p, then by persisting in believing that p, one is violating
the derivative norm KNBa, even though one may in fact continue to know
p (supposing one did know p to begin with). So, given KNB and KNBa,
there is a very natural explanation of why it can seem that one ought to
give up one’s belief in putative cases of defeat. It is consistent with this
explanation that one’s belief that p can remain knowledge, given that one
can violate KNBa without violating KNB. And arguably, one’s belief can
remain knowledge even if it becomes improbable on one’s evidence that it
is knowledge.
If so, however, this presents a problem for one who, as considered
in § earlier, accepts a package of views on which both the core of idea
of defeat involves probability-lowering and the probability threshold for
knowledge is less than  (say, .). Suppose one’s evidence rightly gives
See Williamson  and . One might worry that KNB and KNBa give conflict-
ing advice in the case in which one knows some p but mistakenly thinks that one does not
know it (thanks to Jessica Brown here). But note that KNB does not state that one must
(continue to) believe whenever one knows, such that one violates it by dropping one’s
knowledgable beliefs. Rather, KNB merely states a necessary condition for the propriety
of believing: it forbids the combination (Bp & ¬Kp).

one a probability of . for p, and that on this basis (given that package
of views), one knows, because p is true. Still, one might gain evidence
which makes the probability of p go up while also making the probability
that one knows p go down. For suppose one then gets evidence (E) that
the truth of p is (or was) subject to a large lottery, where p is (was) .
likely. The package of views under consideration claims that you initially
knew p by being at .. Gaining E makes p’s probability go up to .,
but it makes the probability that you know p go down because intuitively,
one can’t know that a lottery ticket will lose on the basis of mere statis-
tical probability. But if so, the evidence from E defeats your knowledge
without it lowering p’s probability. So either defeat does not consist solely
in probability lowering, or one can indeed continue to know even if it be-
comes improbable on one’s evidence that one knows (and in the presence
of misleading evidence, namely E, which makes probable that one does
not know).
. Rebutting defeat
We propose to handle putative cases of rebutting defeat in much the same
way as putative cases of undercutting defeat, namely, by appeal to the
notion that in cases of so-called rebutting defeat, one acquires evidence
that one’s belief is not knowledge; and if one believes what that evidence
suggests, then by KNBa one must surrender one’s belief. Rebutting defeat
differs from undercutting defeat in that rebutting defeat involves acquir-
ing evidence not merely that one’s belief that p lacks a certain connection
to the truth that p, but that in fact one’s belief is false. But were one to
acquire evidence that one’s belief is false, one thereby acquires evidence
that one’s belief is not knowledge; and if acquiring such evidence leads
one to believe or accept that one does not know, then by KNBa one ought
to stop believing the proposition in question.
Again, our diagnosis based on KNB and KNBa claims that one can continue know-
ing p even if it is probable that, or one believes or accepts that, one’s belief that p isn’t
knowledge.

Now, one might suppose that in the rebutting scenario, there is a diffi-
culty for our suggestion that such cases really involve acquiring evidence
that one’s belief is false. Acquiring evidence that p is false should make
one’s probability for p go down. If it is true that E=K—a thesis that
would be a natural accompaniment to a knowledge-centric view such as
we are seeking to defend—then p will have a probability of  on one’s evi-
dence just so long as one does in fact know it, and so no evidence that one
could possibly acquire will be capable of diminishing p’s probability on
one’s total evidence.
As before, one need not endorse E=K to see this point; any view on
which known propositions are (or can become) part of one’s evidence will
face a similar difficulty here. If such a view holds that knowing that p lets
p into one’s evidence set E, then the probability of p | E = , and adding
any other evidence to E will not drop the probability of p from . Thus,
as before in §, much turns here on what it is to “acquire” evidence or add
a proposition to one’s evidence; one’s story about that will in turn affect
how best to characterize rebutting defeat. But we can agree that if one
acquires evidence which does lower one’s probability of p, one thereby
loses knowledge that p. That case will obtain when one drops one’s belief
that p.
Suppose that one knows that there is an oak tree in a particular quad
on the basis of seeing that there is; knowledge is factive, so an oak tree
is there, and on a propositional view about evidence, presumably that
proposition is now part of one’s evidence. One commits it to memory; but
one is later presented with information to the effect that there is no oak
tree in that quad. What would it take for one to “acquire” a rebutting
If Pr(p | E&D) < Pr(¬p | E&D), then adding D to one’s evidence E should reduce the
probability of p (unless, of course, the probability of p on one’s total evidence is already
; in that case, the above inequality would not hold).
This is so even if false propositions can be added to one’s evidence. Note though that
if ¬p is added to an E containing p, one is (if p stays in E) already incoherent in virtue of
violating the probability axioms.
Perhaps someone testifies that there is not; or perhaps one returns to the spot where
one (thought one) saw it and discovers that one now sees no tree there (and little enough
time has passed where it is implausible to suppose it was removed without a trace).

defeater here? One might now believe that there is no oak tree there, and
on pain of inconsistency, one drops one’s belief that there is an oak tree
there; alternatively, one might choose to suspend judgement on whether
there is an oak tree there. Either way, on E=K, the relevant proposition
(that there is an oak tree there) would no longer be a part of one’s evi-
dence. But if one rejects the information to the effect that there is no oak
tree in that quad and continues on believing that there is, the proposition
that there is no oak tree there does not get into one’s evidence. And if it
is not added to one’s evidence, there is no clear way for that proposition
to defeat one’s knowledge that there is an oak tree there. More generally,
there is no way for a proposition which is not added to one’s evidence
to reduce the probability, on that evidence, of any proposition (within or
outside that evidence). (Similar results ensue if we merely take believed
propositions to be part of one’s evidence.)
A defeatist may want to call the above a normative defeater case: being
presented with information to the effect that one’s belief is false intro-
duces a proposition one should believe which defeats even if one doesn’t
believe it. (Perhaps the candidate proposition is the negation of the be-
lieved proposition, or perhaps it is the proposition that one’s belief about
the oak has been unreliably formed or sustained.) But that approach is
implausibly strong: if you’re being warmed by a heat fan and simulta-
neously I tell you that you are cold, you can nevertheless know that you
are hot and reject what I am saying. So defeatists who like the norma-
tive defeat approach need a principled account of which propositions one
should believe, which in turn defeat if one does not believe them. That
account must include a non-circular story about why (with rebutters) one
should believe the negation of what one knows; and in particular, it owe
us a story about what it takes to “acquire” such a defeater even when that
Relatedly, this kind of case calls into question intuitions of defeat based on simulta-
neously getting two bits of evidence, one which on its own would enable one to know,
and the other which defeats it (cf. simultaneous cases considered by Jessica Brown).
Goldberg (forthcominga, forthcomingb) admirably attempts to provide the first full-
fledged account of normative defeat in terms of knowledge or evidence one “should have
had”. For some concerns and criticisms of his approach, see Benton forthcominga.

proposition does not make it into one’s evidence because one rejects the
defeater.
Opting for our way of handling defeat offers the externalist a way out
of the uncomfortable position considered in § above, namely it offers
an explanation of the motivation for defeatism which also obviates the
need to include a defeat condition on knowledge at all. Notably, appeal-
ing to the Knowledge Norm of Belief is no ad hoc move for an epistemic
externalist. Rather, KNB is the most natural accompaniment to epistemic
externalism. The externalist thought that it is possible for belief to be un-
justified in virtue of environmental factors beyond the subject’s purview
is best accounted for in terms of KNB: the subject who is unlucky enough
to be in an epistemically unfriendly environment is failing to live up to
KNB, though she is plausibly excused since she meets the derivative norm
KNBa.
 Conclusion
This paper has argued that there are implementation problems with the
notion of defeat in epistemology. § revealed these problems on an inter-
nalist probabilistic framework in which defeaters do their work by lower-
ing one’s probability for a proposition: in particular, there is no uniform
way of spelling out what it is for a defeater to be added to one’s evidence
which enables the defeatist to have both of what they want, namely for
the defeater to lower one’s probability for some p, but for the evidence
(apart from that defeater) to confirm p over skeptical hypotheses concern-
ing p. § argued that defeatism sits uneasily with most varieties of ex-
ternalism about knowledge. § offers a new explanation of defeat intu-
itions, one which fits well with the E=K account of evidence, and which
allows that one can retain knowledge in the face of cases of putative de-
feat. Indeed, the agonies of defeat detailed in §§– might make E=K and
anti-defeatism look all the more plausible.
Compare Williamson’s (forthcoming) account of justification vs. excuses.

Given the doubts we’ve raised for the place of defeat in an epistemol-
ogy which fits knowledge with evidential probability, defeatists should
presumably believe they have a defeater for their view. But by their own
lights, if they have a defeater for their view, they are thereby unjustified
in continuing to hold their view. Defeatists should consider their view
defeated.
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